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ABSTRACT 
 
Rural SHS electrification programs have been implemented in most countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region using a range of delivery and financial mechanisms. Most of these 
programs, however, have not managed to keep pace with population increases. In Fiji 
the Program is implemented by the Department of Energy (DoEF) and has been 
developed to provide electricity for lighting for remote households located in rural areas 
where supplying electricity via the grid is not an economic option. This research aimed 
to provide a better understanding on the Fijian SHS program. A survey was carried out 
to measure the program success and to understand the issues related to program 
development.  
 
The approaches used in implementation of the Fijian program are similar to those 
adopted in other countries of the region. The reported lack of success of the Fijian 
program therefore cannot be readily attributed to substantive differences from other 
programs in terms of the approach being used. Survey results shows that the impacts of 
the program on social issues are positive. The concept of RESCO did not support the 
Fiji program. The program is relies on donor-supplied capital equipment to get started 
therefore not commercially replicable. All components under the program are owned by 
the Government and the tariff was designed only to cover the monitoring cost. It was 
found that the implementation of the program suffers from a lack of well developed 
support infrastructure. This manifests itself in weak monitoring and maintenance 
program that gives rise to significant technical problem. The program also suffers from 
lack of planning and policy. It is not a full RESCO program as the program is totally 
run by the Government and there is no service company who is responsible for the 
program. Government has not been generally successful in providing quality after sales 
support of the program.  Overall, the program concept was good but it needs proper 
planning and implementation mechanism to make this program successful. There is a 
need to develop proper monitoring systems available under the program mechanism and 
ensuring quality service, quality components and implementation of the policy.  1.  Introduction 
One component of the rural electrification program in Fiji that is implemented by the 
Department of Energy of Fiji (DoEF) involves the now standard approach of installing 
solar home systems (SHS) on houses in rural villages that are remote from the grid.  
Although the approaches used in the implementation of the Fijian SHS program are 
similar to those adopted in most of the other SHS programs that are being implemented 
in other countries in the region, many of which are relatively successful, the Fijian 
program has been reported to have experienced several problems that have impacted on 
its success (Gonelevu, 2006). This study followed on from a previous survey of 
program implementers in the Asia Pacific region (Urmee et al., 2008, Urmee et al., 
2009) and was undertaken in order to better understand the reasons behind the reported 
limited success of the Fijian SHS program. It involved a comprehensive survey of all 
stakeholder groups associated with the design and implementation of the Fijian SHS 
program, as well as users of the solar systems installed through the program.  
 
2. Background 
Under the Rural Electrification Policy, endorsed by the Fijian cabinet in 1993, rural 
villages are able to request Government assistance for electrification. The rural 
electrification program is administered by the Rural Electrification Unit (REU) within 
the DoEF (Johnston et al., 2004;  Johnston, 2008). Under this program, the government 
provides 90% of the capital cost of remote area electricity supply systems and the 
community provides the other 10%. The Policy also includes a uniform tariff policy and 
regardless of the type of electricity generation system used to supply electricity to those 
in remote areas, or of the actual cost of electricity production, all customers are charged 
the same rate tariff that those on the grid on the main island of Vitu Levu.  
The Fijian Energy Authority (FEA) has responsibility for supplying electricity to those 
on the main grid and another key element of the rural electrification policy is for the 
FEA to have a clear delimitation between the areas that will be connected in the future 
to the main grid and those areas that will not be connected at any stage, with the latter 
being eligible for support under the rural electrification policy.  
Funding is provided to the REU from the FEA’s budget and the limited amount of 
funding that is made available, combined with the cross-subsidisation policy, restricts 
the number of households that can be provided with access to electricity in remote rural 
villages to approximately 2,000 new households per year. As this is of a similar order to 
the rate of population growth, the rural electrification program is not currently resulting 
in a long-term reduction in the number of households in Fiji without access to electricity 
in the country.  
Under the rural electrification program, rural villages have the choice of being 
connected to the main electricity grid, where this is technically and economically 
feasible, or having a village mini-grid supplied by a standalone diesel generator or 
renewable energy system, such as a small hydro-electric scheme (DoEF, 2006). A third 
option of having solar home systems (SHS) installed on houses is offered to a relatively 
small number of villages on second largest island, Vanua Levu.  The first SHS trial program was initiated in 2000 with assistance from the Pacific 
International Centre for High Technology Research (PICHTR) based in Hawaii 
(Sauturaga et al., 2004). That pilot project involved the installation of 60 systems using 
a Renewable Energy Service Company (RESCO) model, with the government retaining 
ownership of the solar PV systems, and the RESCO having responsibility for installing 
and maintaining the systems. Households that had systems installed were charged a fee 
that was set to cover RESCO’s costs of maintaining the systems and to provide a profit 
margin for the RESCO.  
A further 96 additional systems were installed in 2002 using funding provided by the 
Governments of Japan and Fiji. Between 2003 and 2007, approximately 100 systems 
were installed per year, with a total of approximately 700 PV systems being installed 
under the program by 2008. The most recently installed systems comprise two 55 Wp 
solar panels, a 100 Ah open cell lead acid plate automotive type battery, an Enercash 
charge controller with a prepayment meter, three 11 W CFLs, a LED night light and a 
DC plug that can be used to operate a radio.  Householders pay F$14 (AUS$9.70) for a 
card, purchased through local post offices, with a code that is used to activate the charge 
controller for a period of one-month.  
 
3.  Survey  
The purpose of the survey was to better understand the reasons for the reported lack of 
success of the program. It was considered that by surveying all stakeholders, including 
government policy makers, program implementers, system users and service providers 
responsible for installing and maintaining the systems, the extent of any lack of success 
and the reasons for that lack of could be better understood. The survey used a 
combination of socio-economic analysis and program evaluation techniques, including 
structured, semi-structured and open-ended interviews, focus groups, household 
surveys, and participant observation. This information was used to comment on the 
program’s success and its strengths and weaknesses, the extent to which it has been 
successful or unsuccessful, the primary reasons behind this success or lack of success 
and the factors that constrain its potential to expand and to become more sustainable 
without ongoing funding support from government or from international donors.   
 
The number of those in each category interviewed during the survey is as follows: 
 
•  Policymakers: 4 
•  Implementing agency : 1(as  there is only one agency, 4 staff involved in the 
program implementation were interviewed) 
•  Private company providing the maintenance and monitoring service: 2 
•  Donor agency: 1 
•  Households/System Users: 100 (using a questionnaire survey schedule)  
 
Izbrisano: dThe survey results were categorised into one of four broad criteria [implementation 
mechanism, financial mechanism, social, policy], which were coded into sub-criteria 
and further coded into concepts (Table 1). This was done in order to aid an 
understanding and evaluation of the program. Using these categories, the survey results 
were analysed using the NVivo qualitative software program (Richard 1999; NVivo, 
2008), with each criteria illustrated by a model imported from the NVivo program.  
 
Table 1: Criteria, sub-criteria and concepts used 
Criteria Sub-criteria  Concepts 
Objective of the program 
Institutional framework 
Supply Chain 
Market demand assessment 
Range of system offered 
System size determination 
Program Actor Selection 
Institutional 
approach 
Awareness development to users  
Users training 
Technician training 
Technical performance evaluation 
Technical 
performance and 
training 
Training manual 
Reliable customer service 
Component selection process 
 
Implementation 
mechanism 
Maintenance & 
Monitoring 
Regular monitoring Table 1 Continued. 
Criteria for funding  
Funding Sources   Funding 
Financing through bank 
Loan repayment 
Monthly Fee 
Revenue Collection 
Cost Recovery  
Tariff 
Affordability of the users  
System price 
Income generation  
Financial 
Mechanism 
Economical 
perspective  
Affordability of the users  
Cultural difference 
User's Behaviour 
Attitude towards system  
Customer satisfaction  
Social impact 
Decision making 
Relationships with service providers 
Requirements 
Social 
Satisfaction level  
Gender issues 
Lack of policy 
Implementation of policy 
Rural electrification policy 
Lack of policy 
Government requirement 
Government Policy 
Country specific need 
Conflict between grid and RE 
RE Policy 
  
  
   Future plan for electricity access 
Policy advocacy 
Policy 
Bureaucracy 
 
 4. Survey results  
 
Institutional criteria 
A survey of system users found approximately 20% of installed systems to be faulty 
fail. This corroborated the findings of the earlier study that the Fijian SHS program was 
experiencing problems. The private maintenance company reported that when it took on 
the contract for installing and maintaining systems in July 2007, it had found 30% of 
existing systems, and over 50% of systems in some of the more remote villages, to be 
faulty.  Most of the faults in the installed systems resulted from a lack of maintenance, 
and particularly from a failure to top the batteries up with distilled water at least once 
every three months and to clean and check the battery terminals. 
One of the reasons for this lack of maintenance stems from a decision by the DoEF not 
to provide training to users on how to use and to maintain their systems or to provide 
manuals with the basic DOs and DON’Ts to system users. The reason for this decision 
on the part of the DoEF has been a preference for any maintenance work to be 
undertaken by trained maintenance staff employed by the contracted maintenance 
company rather than by untrained users.   
A second reson for the high number of systems that were found to be faulty is that the 
maintenance company advises the DoEF of any faulty components, such as batteries or 
lights, but no maintenance is undertaken on the system until the DoEF advices on 
whether the faulty component is to be replaced or not. This makes the maintenance 
process both protracted and expensive.  
The current limited private sector involvement in the program was put forward by some 
as primary cause of the program’s limited success and some stakeholders expressed a 
view that the maintenance program would be improved if the program was implemented 
on a RESCO model to the greatest degree possible rather than the government retaining 
both the ownership of the solar systems and the responsibility for monitoring and 
maintaining of the systems. The DoEFheld a diametrically opposed view that while its 
intention is to hand over responsibility for the program to the private sector at some 
stage, that has not been possible to date as local businesses have not yet developed the 
necessary technical, financial and managerial capacity and the experience to effectively 
take on this responsibility and that neither of two companies that currently offer this 
service possesses the necessary resources required. Neither, for example, has a portable 
battery charger in either the field in remote sites or in their local offices. Recharging 
batteries can therefore take users several days due to the need to take their batteries to 
the company’s head office, leave them to be charged and to then return with the charged 
batteries. This is required even to top up their batteries with distilled water, making the 
task of maintaining the systems onerous and time consuming for both customers and the 
private service provider.  
The lack of resources and of capacity within the private sector appears to be to some 
extent the result of a chicken and egg impasse, with local businesses unwilling to invest 
in developing capacity and expertise while the number of solar systems installed through the program remains too low for a private company to be able to operate a 
successful maintenance business. Government stakeholders indicated that they had 
recognised this problem and the need to facilitate the development of businesses that 
could be involved in the program.  
The lack of resources and capacity is reflected in the system for supplying replacement 
spare parts. Spare parts, including batteries, are not stocked by the company contracted 
to provide the maintenance service and if replacement parts are required, the company 
and sends a list to DoEF head office in Suva, which dispatches the required equipment. 
The time between a fault being diagnosed and the equipment being replaced can be up 
to three days if the DoEF has the spare parts in stock. If not, and the DoEF has to call 
for tenders for the supply of the parts, it can take over a month. During this period, the 
user is using the monthly credit card that has been paid for to operate the system 
although the system is not operating.    
The government provides customers with new lamps when their lamps burn out. Under 
a service type of mechanism, lamps would be the property of the customer rather than 
property of the service providers, as is the case with grid connected systems. The DoEF 
also needs to purchase new batteries every three to five years, depending on the status of 
the battery. Because the DoEF needs to source funds to purchase new systems as well as 
provide new parts for existing systems, this puts strain on its resources and makes the 
program vulnerable. The limited funding made available to DoEF therefore places a 
serious constraint impacting on the program’s successfulness as it is the primary reason 
for the low numbers of systems installed to date. Furthermore, the resources currently 
allocated to the program are insufficient to enable the DoEF to have field offices or 
outlets in remote areas where the systems have been installed. This results in a situation 
in which DoEF staff require a minimum of two days in some cases to reach an area in 
which systems have been installed.  
A major weakness of the program from the perspective of some stakeholders was the 
lack of choice over system size offered through the program, with only one size being 
offered. While recognising that users differ in both their needs for electricity and in their 
ability to pay, stakeholders from the DoEF expressed a reluctance to modify the 
program to offer different sized systems. The reasons for this reluctance included 
wanting to avoid overstretching the limited resources available to the DoEF to 
implement the program, not wanting to increase the DoEF’s workload, and not wanting 
to compromise or complicate system quality compliance. DoEF stakeholders however 
reported that the single strongest reason for not offering a range of systems sizes to 
users stemmed directly from the Fijian culture of not differentiating government 
services on the basis of household income or ability to pay. 
 
5. Financial  criteria 
The DoEF undertook a survey prior to program implementation to determine the type 
and amount of kerosene, benzine and other fuels used for lighting, and the amount spent on these fuels, in the target rural communities. Based on this information, the DoEF 
calculated the amount of kerosene that a SHS would displace and how much the 
household would save by avoiding the need to buy kerosene. The monthly charge for a 
SHS was then set at a fixed amount to make the SHS a more attractive financial option 
than buying kerosene. That is, the cost of the card that householders pay each month to 
activate their systems was not calculated on the basis of the cost of operating and 
maintaining the systems, but on the typical monthly amount that a household paid for 
kerosene for lighting. The cost of kerosene and benzine, however, has increased 
significantly since the survey was undertaken and those without access to electricity that 
are still using kerosene and benzene for lighting are paying significantly more for their 
lighting than are those that have had SHS installed. The monthly charge for a SHS, 
however, had not been changed at the time the survey was undertaken. 
 
The monthly amount that householders are charged, A$9.70, does not cover system 
replacement costs, but only the costs to the post office of administering the sale of the 
activation cards and the costs of the contract for the maintenance service provider, 
which includes a portion of the costs of spare parts. The DoEF stakeholders interviewed 
estimated that if monthly charge was set at a level that reflected the actual full cost of 
the program, the charge would need to be at least doubled. While some of the policy and 
program implementer stakeholders interviewed expressed a view that the high level of 
subsidisation has had a detrimental impact on the successfulness of the program, most 
regarded the cross-subsidisation to be a political rather than an administrative decision 
and something over which they therefore had no control or say. 
 
The low level at which the monthly fee has been set is compounded by the fact that a 
portion of householders with SHS do not purchase a card to reactivate their systems 
each month. The communal nature of the Fijian culture makes it easier for a household 
to not purchase a card as the SHS are commonly treated as communal property. Those 
that have not paid for a card to reactivate their solar system are able to go to other 
houses in the village and use their electric lighting for studying, etc. The portion of 
households that do not purchase a card is as high as 30% in some villages. In theory, if 
this occurs for three consecutive months the household’s system is removed. In practice, 
however, a time-lag of a couple of months in information on the number of cards that 
have been purchased in a village being received by the DoEF means that this policy is 
not effectively implemented. And even once the DoEF becomes aware that a portion of 
households with systems have not purchased cards to activate their systems, it is 
difficult for the DoEF to identify which households have failed to do so. It was reported 
by some stakeholders that in some cases, although no one had lived in a house for a 
long period and the DoEF had not been collecting fees for the system, the system had 
not been removed. 
Another problem with the fee collection system occurs in cases where the village is 
distant from a post office. In these cases, the DoEF appoints the village headman to sell 
the codes and to collect the money paid by households. The arrangement between the DoEF and the village headman is informal and the money is sometimes not collected by 
the DoEF for several months.  
The Fijian culture also influences the SHS program in another important way. The 
primary driver behind the SHS programs implemented in some countries is to provide 
householders and businesses with a means of increasing their incomes. The electric 
lighting is used enable household members to work after sunlight or the electricity is 
used to offer a service such as mobile phone charging. A part of the additional income 
generated is then used to repay for the SHS. In the case of these Fijian village 
communities, however, not only are there limited business opportunities available in 
these remote rural areas, but the survey of households indicated that those living in 
these communities tend to be happy with what they have and that their goal is not to 
increase their work hours in order to become wealthier. The primary value of the SHS to 
those living in these communities is to increase their comfort. Even this, however, is not 
a straightforward driver for the SHS program as the culture in these communities is to 
place more importance on the afterlife than on comfort in this life. 
 
6. Social and environmental criteria 
User satisfaction with the systems installed through the program is high. The SHS are 
considered to be reliable and to be financially attractive option compared to kerosene, 
benzine, dry cell batteries or small petrol generators. Users reported several benefits 
apart from increased comfort, including improved capacity for children to study at 
home, a cleaner indoor environment, the facilitation of social gatherings and an ability 
to undertake activities during the evening that they were could not be undertaken using 
kerosene or benzine lamps.  
The low number of complaints about the adequacy or performance systems reported 
through the survey may have been due in part to the Fijian culture of not complaining 
about government services. The main dissatisfaction expressed over the program 
concerned the inflexibility of the service and the necessity for users to go to a post 
office to purchase an activation code. This was an issue for those in the more isolated 
villages for whom a return trip to the post office could take up to a full day. A number 
of users interviewed expressed a willingness to pay a higher fee if a larger system was 
installed. 
 
7. Policy criteria 
 
Those interviewed that had responsibility for implementing the SHS program 
maintained that the clear policy demarcation between the areas that will be at some 
stage connected to the grid and those areas where the grid will not be extend to greatly 
assists in achieving the program’s goals. Many of those interviewed also expressed the 
view that the SHS program needed to be customised to suit the cultural and other needs 
of those in the communities, with community lighting being particularly important.  
 Several respondents mentioned the lack of a specific Fijian renewable energy policy to 
be a problem for the SHS program. Political instability and changes to government 
policies that supported the renewable energy program were regarded by many to be a 
major contributor to the limited success of the current SHS program. A negative change 
in policy that was cited was the reversal of the former government’s decision to waive 
the import excise on solar systems in order to encourage the use of solar energy. 
 
Several of those from private companies that were interviewed raised the difficulty in 
dealing with government processes, with the two years that had been taken by 
government to select maintenance and monitoring contractor cited as an example. This 
was given as one of the primary reason for private companies not being enthusiastic 
about participating in the program. 
 
8. Stakeholders’ views on barriers to program success and possible improvements 
Stakeholders were asked what barriers they had encountered during the design, 
implementation and post-operation stages. Some respondent mentioned data 
management as the main barrier as without this is would be difficult to increase revenue 
to be increased.  It was recognised that until the DoEF has accurate monthly reports of 
the number of households that have purchased a card, it would remain difficult for the 
DoEF to obtain a clear picture of the revenue shortfall and to take action to reduce 
future revenue shortfalls.  
 
The lack of an adequate monitoring and maintenance program was a major cause of 
concern for many stakeholders. The cause for this, however, tended to be attributed to 
the lack of funding provided to the DoEF to implement the program as is accepted that 
finding a company capable and willing to do the work within the budget offered by the 
DoEF is not easy. Some recognised that a part of the solution was the need to increase 
the cost to households for the cards used to reactivate their systems as the revenue 
collected from the sale of the cards does match the actual maintenance and replacement 
costs.  
Policy makers, implementers (DoEF) and the maintenance service provider were asked 
how successful they considered the program to be. Many were of the view that the 
program could be improved. Many saw a need for DoEF staff to have more regular 
contact with users, for users to be better informed on what their systems were and were 
not able to provide, and for training of users to maintain their systems.  
 
9. Discussion 
The Fijian SHS program is successful to the extent that those that are provided with 
access to electricity through the program report improvements in their quality of life, a 
general satisfaction with the performance and reliability of systems, and a financial gain from paying a lower amount in monthly SHS charges then they would for an equivalent 
amount of lighting from kerosene or benzine. The program is also successful in terms of 
achieving its objective of using solar home systems to provide electricity for lighting to 
rural households. The real question is whether that objective can be achieved more 
effectively and more efficiently so that the numbers of those that are provided with 
access to electricity in this way can be increased and in a way that results in improved 
system performance. 
 
All stakeholders, however, recognise that the program has several major weaknesses, all 
of which impact to varying degrees on the success of the program in terms of the 
numbers of systems installed each year, the proportion of installed systems that are 
faulty, and in the inefficiencies in the revenue collection system. Not all stakeholders 
perceive the same weakness and there is disagreement among the different stakeholder 
groups on how readily some of these weaknesses can be remedied. In reality, some of 
these weaknesses are likely to be more intractable then are others, with those that stem 
from the Fijian culture likely to be the most intractable. Those cultural issues will 
continue to have a major influence on the overall nature of the program and its 
objectives. The lack of interest on the part of those living in remote rural communities 
in using their SHS to increase their income levels, for example, means that it would be 
difficult to radically change the program from that of a government program based on 
subsidies to one based on micro-credit provided by private financial institutions as the 
latter requires system owners to use their systems to generate income to repay the loans. 
Similarly, the strong cultural ethic of not differentiating government services based on 
ability to pay or household income is likely to cause resistance to any proposals to have 
a range of system sizes offered through the program.  
 
Those weaknesses that result directly from Government policy are unlikely to be as 
intractable, but are nonetheless likely to be difficult to change. It is completely 
understandable, for example, for a government to regard the provision of access to 
electricity as a service and to be willing to subsidise programs aimed at achieving this. 
The governments of many developed countries in the early Twentieth Century had rural 
electrification programs in place and some continue to use uniform tariff policies that 
was funded using a cross subsidy by inflating electricity prices paid by urban electricity 
customers in order to reduce the price for rural electricity customers.  The subsidisation 
of SHS, however, is not a cross subsidy but a direct government subsidy and is a double 
edged sword as the funding provided to the government agency vested with the 
responsibility for implementing the program is limited and this severely constrains the 
degree to which the Fijian Government’s rural electrification policy can be achieved.   
 
Other weaknesses in the program arise because of the small scale of the program. 
Implementing a SHS program in which less than a thousand households participate, for 
example, requires a very different approach to a program in which there are hundreds of 
thousands of participating households, such as the program implemented in Bangladesh.  
The major constraint associated with a small program is the limited ability to attract the involvement of the private sector as the scale of the business activities and the 
profitability will be low. Given that only two companies have been established to date 
and only one of these is operating and therefore has a virtual monopoly status suggests 
that the slow and steady approach being pursued by the government to development of 
business capacity and the facilitation of private business involvement is perhaps a 
cautious but prudent one. 
 
The critical question for the Fijian program are which weaknesses can be most readily 
addressed given the constraints imposed on the nature of the program by virtue of the 
cultural and policy framework in which it is implemented.  
 
The single largest improvement in the program that appears to be most readily 
achievable relates to training for system users. It was apparent from the survey results 
that the high number of faulty systems was due to a lack of maintenance and that 
training of system users would be one optionfor reducing this problem. Providing users 
with a manual that indicated the Do’s and Don’ts would also assist in  minimizing 
maintenance cost of the program. It may also have the effect of increasing users’ sense 
of ownership and, therefore, their willingness to take on greater responsibility for 
system maintenance. Preparing and providing users with such a manual, however, 
requires a budget and is therefore a policy issue.   
 
Another problem that has limited the success of the program to date and which may be 
more readily remedied than some of the other problems is the current lack of availability 
of spare parts. The development of local business capable of building and supplying 
spare parts would greatly assist in reducing the time required for replacing spare parts 
and would also assist in managing the increase in costs of spare parts where these are 
imported.  Locally manufactured electronic components (lights, controllers and DC/DC 
converters) could provide reliable components if their design suited the local needs and 
if quality control is maintained. 
Improved collection of payments for the cards for activating systems would also greatly 
improve the strained finances of the program. Another factor impacting on the success 
of the program is the frequency of the fee collection. This issue is closely connected to 
user satisfaction, which is likely to be strongly correlated to system reliability, and 
therefore, to the training of users to maintain their systems. Improved data systems for 
recording which households have purchased cards to activate their systems and which 
have not would also increase revenue by making an effective disconnect policy 
possible. 
While the Fijian Government may be unwilling to increase the funding for the program, 
it would appear to be possible to increase the funding available by increasing the 
monthly charges that users pay. The current charge is not only heavily subsidised but 
was calculated on the basis of the amount that households paid forkerosene several 
years ago, and the price of kerosene is likely to have increased over the interim period. 
An increase in the monthly charge, while still keeping the costs of a solar system the cost of using kerosene for lighting should therefore be possible. If the charge was 
increased, however, it would be important to first address the system maintenance 
issues to increase system reliability.  .  
 
In summary, the solar program in Fiji suffers from the limited funding that is made 
available to those implementing the program. The problems that this creates are 
compounded by low revenue collection, limited maintenance capacity and the small 
scale nature of the program. The success of the program could be increased through 
several relatively simple measures, none of which would involve large costs.   
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